Pure bargaining problems and the Shapley rule

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dc.contributor	Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada II
dc.contributor	Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs
dc.contributor.author	Carreras Escobar, Francisco
dc.contributor.author	Owen Salazar, Guillermo
dc.date	2009-03
dc.identifier.citation	Carreras, F.; Owen, G. "Pure bargaining problems and the Shapley rule". 2009.
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2117/7054
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.rights	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject	Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa
dc.subject	Game theory
dc.subject	Cooperative games (Mathematics)
dc.subject	Jocs, Teoria de
dc.subject	Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
dc.subject	Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory
dc.title	Pure bargaining problems and the Shapley rule
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/report
dc.description.abstract	Pure bargaining problem are considered. By attaching a quasi-additive cooperative game to chatch one of them, a Shapley rule for this case of problems is derived from the classical Shapley value for games. The analysis of this new rule includes some axiomatic characterizations and a comparison with the classical proportional rule.