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Pure bargaining problems and the Shapley rule
Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Owen Salazar, Guillermo
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada II; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs
Pure bargaining problems with transferable utility are considered. By associating a quasi-additive cooperative game with each one of them, a Shapley rule for this class of problems is derived from the Shapley value for games. The analysis of this new rule includes axiomatic characterizations and a comparison with the proportional rule.
Peer Reviewed
Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs
Game theory
Cooperative games (Mathematics)
Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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