Title:
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Pure bargaining problems and the Shapley rule
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Author:
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Carreras Escobar, Francisco; Owen Salazar, Guillermo
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Other authors:
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Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada II; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs |
Abstract:
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Pure bargaining problems with transferable utility are considered. By associating a quasi-additive cooperative game with each one of them, a Shapley rule for this class of problems is derived from the Shapley value for games. The analysis of this new rule includes axiomatic characterizations and a comparison with the proportional rule. |
Abstract:
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Peer Reviewed |
Subject(s):
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-Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs -Game theory -Cooperative games (Mathematics) -Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica) -Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory |
Rights:
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Document type:
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Article - Published version Article |
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