Universitat de Barcelona
2016-01-18T10:46:08Z
2016-01-18T10:46:08Z
2015
2016-01-18T10:46:09Z
We show that the family of assignment matrices which give rise to the same nucleolus form a compact join-semilattice with one maximal element, which is always a valuation. -see p.43, Topkis, 1998-. We give an explicit form of this valuation matrix. The above family is in general not a convex set, but path-connected, and we construct minimal elements of this family. We also analyze the conditions to ensure that a given vector is the nucleolus of some assignment game.
Working document
English
Teoria de jocs; Assignació de recursos; Matemàtica financera; Models matemàtics; Estudis de viabilitat; Game theory; Ressource allocation; Business mathematics; Mathematical models; Feasibility studies
Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ub.edu/ubeconomics/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/333WEB.pdf
UB Economics – Working Papers, 2015, E15/333
[WP E-Eco15/333]
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Martínez de Albéniz et al., 2015
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
