dc.contributor.author
Martínez de Albéniz, F. Javier
dc.contributor.author
Rafels, Carles
dc.contributor.author
Ybern, Neus
dc.date.issued
2016-01-18T10:46:08Z
dc.date.issued
2016-01-18T10:46:08Z
dc.date.issued
2016-01-18T10:46:09Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/68834
dc.description.abstract
We show that the family of assignment matrices which give rise to the same nucleolus form a compact join-semilattice with one maximal element, which is always a valuation. -see p.43, Topkis, 1998-. We give an explicit form of this valuation matrix. The above family is in general not a convex set, but path-connected, and we construct minimal elements of this family. We also analyze the conditions to ensure that a given vector is the nucleolus of some assignment game.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
dc.relation
Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ub.edu/ubeconomics/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/333WEB.pdf
dc.relation
UB Economics – Working Papers, 2015, E15/333
dc.relation
[WP E-Eco15/333]
dc.rights
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Martínez de Albéniz et al., 2015
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]
dc.subject
Teoria de jocs
dc.subject
Assignació de recursos
dc.subject
Matemàtica financera
dc.subject
Models matemàtics
dc.subject
Estudis de viabilitat
dc.subject
Ressource allocation
dc.subject
Business mathematics
dc.subject
Mathematical models
dc.subject
Feasibility studies
dc.title
Insights into the nucleolus of the assignment game
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
