Universitat de Barcelona
2026-03-09T10:09:41Z
2026-03-09T10:09:41Z
2026-01-01
2026-03-09T10:09:41Z
In this paper, we explore the issue of manipulability in the setting of financial systems by considering two weak forms of immunity: merging-proofness and splitting-proofness. Not surprisingly, splitting-proofness conflicts with basic requirements such as the priority of debt over equity and the limited liability of equity. Remarkably, we provide a comprehensive characterization of the class of bankruptcy rules that gives rise to financial rules that satisfy merging-proofness.
Article
Versió publicada
Anglès
Elsevier
Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.011
Games and Economic Behavior, 2026, vol. 155, num.212-227
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.011
cc-by (c) Calleja Cortés, Pedro; Llerena Garrés, Francesc, 2026
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
