dc.contributor.author
Calleja Cortés, Pedro
dc.contributor.author
Llerena Garrés, Francesc
dc.date.accessioned
2026-03-10T00:14:23Z
dc.date.available
2026-03-10T00:14:23Z
dc.date.issued
2026-03-09T10:09:41Z
dc.date.issued
2026-03-09T10:09:41Z
dc.date.issued
2026-01-01
dc.date.issued
2026-03-09T10:09:41Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/227923
dc.identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/227923
dc.description.abstract
In this paper, we explore the issue of manipulability in the setting of financial systems by considering two weak forms of immunity: merging-proofness and splitting-proofness. Not surprisingly, splitting-proofness conflicts with basic requirements such as the priority of debt over equity and the limited liability of equity. Remarkably, we provide a comprehensive characterization of the class of bankruptcy rules that gives rise to financial rules that satisfy merging-proofness.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.relation
Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.011
dc.relation
Games and Economic Behavior, 2026, vol. 155, num.212-227
dc.relation
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.011
dc.rights
cc-by (c) Calleja Cortés, Pedro; Llerena Garrés, Francesc, 2026
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.title
Merging-splitting-proofness in financial systems: A characterization result
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
