Philosophical equilibrism, rationality, and the commitment challenge

Fecha de publicación

2020-01-31T10:44:36Z

2020-09-20T05:10:26Z

2018-09-20

2020-01-31T10:44:36Z

Resumen

Helen Beebee (2018) defends a view of the aims of philosophy she calls 'equilibrism'. Equilibrism denies that philosophy aims at knowledge, and maintains that the collective aim of philosophy is to find equilibria capable of withstanding examination. In this note, I probe equilibrism by focusing on how disagreement challenges our doxastic commitment to our own philosophical theories. Call this the Commitment Challenge. I argue that the Commitment Challenge comes in three varieties and that endorsing equilibrism provides us with an answer to one of them only.

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Oxford University Press

Documentos relacionados

Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoy019

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2018, vol. 118, num. 3, p. 377-385

https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoy019

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(c) The Aristotelian Society, 2018

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