Philosophical equilibrism, rationality, and the commitment challenge

Publication date

2020-01-31T10:44:36Z

2020-09-20T05:10:26Z

2018-09-20

2020-01-31T10:44:36Z

Abstract

Helen Beebee (2018) defends a view of the aims of philosophy she calls 'equilibrism'. Equilibrism denies that philosophy aims at knowledge, and maintains that the collective aim of philosophy is to find equilibria capable of withstanding examination. In this note, I probe equilibrism by focusing on how disagreement challenges our doxastic commitment to our own philosophical theories. Call this the Commitment Challenge. I argue that the Commitment Challenge comes in three varieties and that endorsing equilibrism provides us with an answer to one of them only.

Document Type

Article


Accepted version

Language

English

Publisher

Oxford University Press

Related items

Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoy019

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2018, vol. 118, num. 3, p. 377-385

https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoy019

Recommended citation

This citation was generated automatically.

Rights

(c) The Aristotelian Society, 2018

This item appears in the following Collection(s)