dc.contributor.author
Palmira, Michele
dc.date.issued
2020-01-31T10:44:36Z
dc.date.issued
2020-09-20T05:10:26Z
dc.date.issued
2018-09-20
dc.date.issued
2020-01-31T10:44:36Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/149141
dc.description.abstract
Helen Beebee (2018) defends a view of the aims of philosophy she calls 'equilibrism'. Equilibrism denies that philosophy aims at knowledge, and maintains that the collective aim of philosophy is to find equilibria capable of withstanding examination. In this note, I probe equilibrism by focusing on how disagreement challenges our doxastic commitment to our own philosophical theories. Call this the Commitment Challenge. I argue that the Commitment Challenge comes in three varieties and that endorsing equilibrism provides us with an answer to one of them only.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
Oxford University Press
dc.relation
Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoy019
dc.relation
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2018, vol. 118, num. 3, p. 377-385
dc.relation
https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoy019
dc.rights
(c) The Aristotelian Society, 2018
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
dc.subject
Teoria (Filosofia)
dc.subject
Teoria del coneixement
dc.subject
Theory (Philosophy)
dc.subject
Theory of knowledge
dc.title
Philosophical equilibrism, rationality, and the commitment challenge
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
