Title:
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Does electoral competition curb party favoritism?
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Author:
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Curto Grau, Marta; Solé Ollé, Albert; Sorribas, Pilar
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Other authors:
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Universitat de Barcelona |
Abstract:
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We study whether incumbents facing uncontested elections channel public spending towards co-partisan officials more than is the case of incumbents that are worried about reelection. We draw on data on capital transfers allocated by Spanish regions to local governments during 1995-2007. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document strong and robust effects. We find that a mayor belonging to the party of the regional president obtains twice the amount in grants received by an opposition's mayor. This effect is much greater for regional incumbents that won the previous election by a large margin, but it disappears for highly competitive elections. |
Subject(s):
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-Partits polítics -Eleccions -Representació proporcional -Anàlisi de regressió -Political parties -Elections -Proportional representation -Regression analysis |
Rights:
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(c) American Economic Association, 2018
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Document type:
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Article Article - Published version |
Published by:
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American Economic Association
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