Abstract:
|
The Gibbard–Satterthwaite (1973/75) theorem roughly states that we have to
accept dictatorship or manipulability in case of at least three alternatives. A large strand of
the literature estimates the degree of manipulability of social choice functions (e.g. Aleskerov
and Kurbanov, 1999, Favardin et al., 2002, and Aleskerov et al., 2012), most of them employing the Nitzan-Kelly index of manipulability. We take a different approach and introduce
a non-dictatorship index based on our recent work (Bednay et al., 2017), where we have analysed social choice functions based on their distances to the dictatorial rules. By employing
computer simulations, we investigate the relationship between the manipulability and nondictatorship indices of some prominent social choice functions, putting them into a common
framework.
Keywords: Voting rules, dictatorship, manipulability, manipulability index, dictatorship
index.
JEL Classification Number: D71. |