Use this identifier to quote or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/252215

A mechanism to pick the deserving winner
Moskalenko, Anna
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia; Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
A group of individuals is choosing an individual (the winner) among themselves, when the identity of the deserving winner is a common knowledge among individuals. A simple mechanism of voting by veto is proposed as an alternative to the mechanism studied by Amorós (2011). Like Amorós’(2011), the suggested mechanism implements the socially desirable outcome (the deserving winner is chosen) in subgame perfect equilibria. Keywords: Implementation, mechanism design, subgame perfect equilibrium, individuals choosing among themselves, voting by veto. JEL classification: C72, D71, D78
2015
33 - Economia
Jocs no-cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Elecció social
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
10 p.
Working Paper
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-20
         

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