Utilizad este identificador para citar o enlazar este documento: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/254303

Are parliaments with more parties cheaper to Bribe?
Bannikova, Marina; Tasnádi, Attila
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia; Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
We collect data about 172 countries: their parliaments, level of corruption, perceptions of corruption of parliament and political parties. We find weak empirical evidence supporting the conclusion that corruption increases as the number of parties increases. To provide a theoretical explanation of this finding we present a simple theoretical model of parliaments formed by parties, which must decide whether to accept or reject a proposal in the presence of a briber, who is interested in having the bill passed. We compute the number of deputies the briber needs to persuade on average in parliaments with different structures described by the number of parties, the voting quota, and the allocation of seats among parties. We find that the average number of seats needed to be bribed decreases as the number of parties increases. Restricting the minimal number of seats a party may have, we show that the average number of seats to be bribed is smaller in parliaments without small parties. Restricting the maximum number of seats a party may have, we find that under simple majority the average number of seats needed to be bribed is smaller for parliaments in which one party has majority, but under qualified majority it hardly changes. Keywords: Bribing, party composition of a parliament, knapsack problem. JEL Classification Number: D73, D72.
2015
32 - Política
Corrupció política
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
26 p.
Documento de trabajo
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-22
         

Documentos con el texto completo de este documento

Ficheros Tamaño Formato
201522.pdf 953.0 KB PDF

Mostrar el registro completo del ítem