Dimension, egalitarianism and decisiveness of European voting systems

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To access the full text documents, please follow this link: http://hdl.handle.net/2117/91241

dc.contributor	Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtiques
dc.contributor	Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs
dc.contributor.author	Carreras Escobar, Francisco
dc.contributor.author	Freixas Bosch, Josep
dc.contributor.author	Magaña Nieto, Antonio
dc.coverage.spatial	east=4.38189269999998; north=50.8417893; name=Justus Lipsius Building, Rue de la Loi 175, 1000 Bruxelles, Bèlgica
dc.date	2016
dc.identifier.citation	Carreras, F., Freixas, J., Magaña, A. Dimension, egalitarianism and decisiveness of European voting systems. "Operations Research and Decisions", 2016, vol. 26, núm. 2, p. 31-52.
dc.identifier.citation	2081-8858
dc.identifier.citation	10.5277/ord160203
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2117/91241
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation	info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/MTM2015-66818-P
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject	Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs
dc.subject	Game theory
dc.subject	Decision making -- Mathematical models
dc.subject	Voting -- Mathematical models
dc.subject	Dimension
dc.subject	Egalitarianism
dc.subject	Decisiveness
dc.subject	Voting systems
dc.subject	Simple games
dc.subject	Weighted majority games
dc.subject	Shapley–Shubik power index
dc.subject	Jocs, Teoria de
dc.subject	Decisió, Presa de -- Models matemàtics
dc.subject	Vot -- Models matemàtics
dc.subject	Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory
dc.subject	Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91B Mathematical economics
dc.title	Dimension, egalitarianism and decisiveness of European voting systems
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.description.abstract	An analysis of three major aspects has been carried out that may apply to any of the successive voting systems used for the European Union Council of Ministers, from the first one established in the Treaty of Rome in 1958 to the current one established in Lisbon. We mainly consider the voting systems designed for the enlarged European Union adopted in the Athens summit, held in April 2003 but this analysis can be applied to any other system. First, it is shown that the dimension of these voting systems does not, in general, reduce. Next, the egalitarian effects of superposing two or three weighted majority games (often by introducing additional consensus) are considered. Finally, the decisiveness of these voting systems is evaluated and compared.
dc.description.abstract	Peer Reviewed

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