dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
dc.contributor.author |
Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat |
dc.contributor.author |
Manzano, Carolina |
dc.date.accessioned |
2014-01-17T15:08:14Z |
dc.date.available |
2014-01-17T15:08:14Z |
dc.date.created |
2013-12-12 |
dc.date.issued |
2013 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/222196 |
dc.format.extent |
29 p. |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.publisher |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2013-33 |
dc.rights |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
dc.rights |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.source |
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya) |
dc.subject.other |
Bancs centrals |
dc.subject.other |
Política fiscal |
dc.subject.other |
Política monetària |
dc.title |
Independent Central Banks: Low inflation at no cost?: A model with fiscal policy |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.subject.udc |
336 - Finances. Banca. Moneda. Borsa |
dc.embargo.terms |
cap |
dc.description.abstract |
In this article we extend the rational partisan model of Alesina and
Gatti (1995) to include a second policy, fiscal policy, besides monetary policy. It is shown that, with this extension, the politically induced variance
of output is not always eliminated nor reduced by delegating monetary
policy to an independent and conservative central bank. Further, in flation
and output stabilisation will be affected by the degree of conservativeness
of the central bank and by the probability of the less in flation averse party
gaining power.
Keywords: rational partisan theory; fiscal policy; independent central
bank
JEL Classi fication: E58, E63. |