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Independent Central Banks: Low inflation at no cost?: A model with fiscal policy
Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat; Manzano, Carolina
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia; Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
In this article we extend the rational partisan model of Alesina and Gatti (1995) to include a second policy, fiscal policy, besides monetary policy. It is shown that, with this extension, the politically induced variance of output is not always eliminated nor reduced by delegating monetary policy to an independent and conservative central bank. Further, in flation and output stabilisation will be affected by the degree of conservativeness of the central bank and by the probability of the less in flation averse party gaining power. Keywords: rational partisan theory; fiscal policy; independent central bank JEL Classi fication: E58, E63.
336 - Finances. Banca. Moneda. Borsa
Bancs centrals
Política fiscal
Política monetària
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29 p.
Working Paper
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2013-33

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