Utilizad este identificador para citar o enlazar este documento: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/179623

Designing the Optimal Conservativeness of the Central Bank
Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat; Manzano, Carolina
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia; Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
In this paper we propose a new measure of the degree of conservativeness of an inde- pendent central bank and we derive the optimal value from the social welfare perspective. We show that the mere appointment of an independent central bank is not enough to achieve lower inflation, which may explain the mixed results found between central bank independence and inflation in the empirical literature. Further, the optimal central bank should not be too conservative. For instance, we will show that in some circumstances it will be optimal that the central bank is less conservative than society in the Rogoff sense. JEL classification: E58, E63. Keywords: Central bank; Conservativeness; Independence.
2011
35 - Administració pública. Govern. Assumptes militars
Bancs centrals
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17 p.
Documento de trabajo
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2011-26
         

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