dc.contributor.author
Atay, Ata
dc.date.issued
2023-06-19T07:10:34Z
dc.date.issued
2023-06-19T07:10:34Z
dc.date.issued
2017-05-01
dc.date.issued
2023-06-19T07:10:34Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199460
dc.description.abstract
Solymosi and Raghavan (2001), characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. While their proof makes use of graph-theoretical tools, the alternative proof presented here relies on the notion of the buyer-seller exact representative, as introduced by Núñez and Rafels in 2002.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
Elsevier B.V.
dc.relation
Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.03.001
dc.relation
Operations Research Letters, 2017, vol. 45, num. 3, p. 217-219
dc.relation
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.03.001
dc.rights
cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2017
dc.rights
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
dc.subject
Teoria de jocs
dc.subject
Assignació de recursos
dc.subject
Àlgebres de Von Neumann
dc.subject
Problema de Neumann
dc.subject
Resource allocation
dc.subject
Von Neumann algebras
dc.subject
Neumann problem
dc.title
An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
