Universitat de Barcelona
2023-06-19T07:10:34Z
2023-06-19T07:10:34Z
2017-05-01
2023-06-19T07:10:34Z
Solymosi and Raghavan (2001), characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. While their proof makes use of graph-theoretical tools, the alternative proof presented here relies on the notion of the buyer-seller exact representative, as introduced by Núñez and Rafels in 2002.
Article
Accepted version
English
Teoria de jocs; Assignació de recursos; Àlgebres de Von Neumann; Problema de Neumann; Game theory; Resource allocation; Von Neumann algebras; Neumann problem
Elsevier B.V.
Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.03.001
Operations Research Letters, 2017, vol. 45, num. 3, p. 217-219
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.03.001
cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2017
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
