On the Mechanistic Perceptions of Consciousness: From Quantum Mechanics to Consciousness and Free Will and from David Bohm to Benjamin Libet

Fecha de publicación

2023-01-20T10:48:52Z

2023-01-20T10:48:52Z

2022-11-01

2023-01-20T10:48:52Z

Resumen

Biologists and biochemists have been reluctant to en-ter the realm of consciousness with real scientific meth-ods. One approach by Nobel laureate Francis Crick in hisbook "Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul" [1] was to look at scientific papers that, eventu-ally, could give insight into consciousness. The problem, in my opinion, is that the author took data obtained from experiments in nonhuman animals. The question that imme- diately arises is whether studies using animal models can be of interest to what only humans can have, be aware of and verbalize: consciousness. He focused on the visual system; this is puzzling because blindness is not incompatible with consciousness. In fact, we know that subjective events are noted as consciousness in individuals whose cortical primary visual areas are not functional [2].

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IMR Press

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Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.31083/j.jin2106153

Journal Of Integrative Neuroscience, 2022, vol. 21, num. 6, p. 153-156

https://doi.org/10.31083/j.jin2106153

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cc-by (c) Franco Fernández, Rafael, 2022

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

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