dc.contributor.author
García-Carpintero, Manuel
dc.date.issued
2020-03-31T09:48:04Z
dc.date.issued
2020-12-31T06:10:20Z
dc.date.issued
2018-12-31
dc.date.issued
2020-03-31T09:48:04Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/154486
dc.description.abstract
Some speech acts are made indirectly. It is thus natural to think that assertions could also be made indirectly. Grice's conversational implicatures appear to be just a case of this, in which one indirectly makes an assertion or a related constative act by means of a declarative sentence. Several arguments, however, have been given against indirect assertions, by Davis (1999), Fricker (2012), Green (2007, 2015), Lepore & Stone (2010, 2015) and others. This paper confronts and rejects three considerations that have been made: arguments based on the distinction between lying and misleading; arguments based on the ordinary concept of assertion; and arguments based on the testimonial knowledge that assertions provide.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
John Wiley & Sons
dc.relation
Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12116
dc.relation
Philosophical Perspectives, 2018, vol. 32, num. 1, p. 188-218
dc.relation
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12116
dc.rights
(c) John Wiley & Sons, 2018
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
dc.subject
Filosofia del llenguatge
dc.subject
Semàntica (Filosofia)
dc.subject
Philosophy of language
dc.subject
Semantics (Philosophy)
dc.title
Sneaky Assertions
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
