dc.contributor.author
Palmira, Michele
dc.date.issued
2019-12-20T18:03:51Z
dc.date.issued
2021-12-31T06:10:17Z
dc.date.issued
2019-12-20T18:03:51Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/147065
dc.description.abstract
In this note I defend nonreductionism about understanding by arguing that knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding. To this end, I examine Paulina Sliwa's (2015, 2017) novel defence of knowledge‐based Reductionism (Reductionism for short). Sliwa claims that one understands why p if and only if one has a sufficient amount of knowledge why p. Sliwa contends that Reductionism is supported by intuitive verdicts about our uses of 'understanding why' and 'knowing why'. In reply, I first argue that Sliwa's Reductionism leads to a vicious infinite regress. Secondly, I defuse the motivation in favour of Reductionism by showing how the linguistic data can be accommodated within a Nonreductionist framework.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.relation
Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.424
dc.relation
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2019, vol. 8, num. 3, p. 222-231
dc.relation
https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.424
dc.relation
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/675415/EU//DIAPHORA
dc.rights
(c) Northern Institute of Philosophy and Wiley Periodicals, 2019
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
dc.subject
Teoria del coneixement
dc.subject
Semàntica (Filosofia)
dc.subject
Filosofia de la ment
dc.subject
Context (Lingüística)
dc.subject
Theory of knowledge
dc.subject
Semantics (Philosophy)
dc.subject
Philosophy of mind
dc.subject
Context (Linguistics)
dc.title
Defending Nonreductionism About Understanding
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
