Pejorative discourse is not fictional

Publication date

2019-12-20T15:45:54Z

2019-12-31T06:10:18Z

2017

2019-12-20T15:45:54Z

Abstract

Hom and May (2015) argue that pejoratives mean negative prescriptive properties that externally depend on social ideologies, and that this entails a form of fictionalism: pejoratives have null extensions. There are relevant uses of fictional terms that are necessary to describe the content of fictions, and to make true statements about the world, that do not convey that speakers are committed to the fiction. This paper shows that the same constructions with pejoratives typically convey that the speaker is committed to racist ideologies, in contrast with fictional discourse that typically does not. The disanalogy undermines the plausibility of fictionalism about pejoratives. Moreover, the exceptions¿uncommitted uses in embedded constructions¿display features that conflict with Hom and May's explanation of committed uses as conversational implicatures.

Document Type

Article


Accepted version

Language

English

Publisher

Wiley

Related items

Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.258

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2017, vol. 6, num. 4, p. 250-260

https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.258

info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/675415/EU//DIAPHORA

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(c) Northern Institute of Philosophy and Wiley Periodicals, 2017

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