Universitat de Barcelona
2018-04-05T08:08:54Z
2021-12-31T06:10:16Z
2018
2018-04-05T08:08:54Z
We analyze surplus allocation problems where cooperation between agents is restricted both by a communication graph and by a sequence of embedded partitions of the agent set. For this type of problem, we define and characterize two new values extending the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value, respectively. Our results enable the axiomatic comparison between the two values and provide some basic insights for the analysis of fair resource allocation in today's fully integrated societies.
Artículo
Versión aceptada
Inglés
Teoria de jocs; Economia matemàtica; Game theory; Mathematical economics
Elsevier B.V.
Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.02.005
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2018, vol. 93, num. May, p. 114-122
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.02.005
cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2018
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es
