Para acceder a los documentos con el texto completo, por favor, siga el siguiente enlace: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/115898
dc.contributor.author | Revelli, Federico |
---|---|
dc.date | 2017-09-27T11:02:42Z |
dc.date | 2017-09-27T11:02:42Z |
dc.date | 2013 |
dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/115898 |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/115898 |
dc.description | Based on a theoretical model where state limits on local government policy elicit a move from private value (position issue) to common value (valence issue) voting, I exploit exogenous variation in tax limitation rules in over 7,000 Italian municipalities during the 2000s to show that fiscal restraints provoke a fall in voter turnout and number of mayor candidates, and a rise in elected mayors’ valence proxy and win margins. The evidence is compatible with the hypothesis of hierarchical tax limitations fading the ideological stakes of local elections and favoring valence-based party line crossing, thus questioning the influential accountability postulate of the fiscal decentralization lore. |
dc.format | 47 p. |
dc.format | application/pdf |
dc.language | eng |
dc.publisher | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona |
dc.relation | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions |
dc.relation | IEB Working Paper 2013/29 |
dc.relation | [WP E-IEB13/29] |
dc.rights | cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Revelli, 2013 |
dc.rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.subject | Administració fiscal |
dc.subject | Eleccions locals |
dc.subject | Descentralització administrativa |
dc.subject | Tax administration and procedure |
dc.subject | Local elections |
dc.subject | Decentralization in government |
dc.title | Tax limits and local democracy |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |