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Título:	Tax limits and local democracy
Autor/a:	Revelli, Federico
Notas:	Based on a theoretical model where state limits on local government policy elicit a move from private value (position issue) to common value (valence issue) voting, I exploit exogenous variation in tax limitation rules in over 7,000 Italian municipalities during the 2000s to show that fiscal restraints provoke a fall in voter turnout and number of mayor candidates, and a rise in elected mayors’ valence proxy and win margins. The evidence is compatible with the hypothesis of hierarchical tax limitations fading the ideological stakes of local elections and favoring valence-based party line crossing, thus questioning the influential accountability postulate of the fiscal decentralization lore.
Materia(s):	-Administració fiscal -Eleccions locals -Descentralització administrativa -Tax administration and procedure -Local elections -Decentralization in government
Derechos:	cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Revelli, 2013 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
Tipo de documento:	Documento de trabajo
Editor:	Institut d’Economia de Barcelona
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