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dc.contributor.author | Daniele, Gianmarco |
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dc.date | 2017-09-18T06:25:33Z |
dc.date | 2017-09-18T06:25:33Z |
dc.date | 2015 |
dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/115502 |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/115502 |
dc.description | A central question in terms of political (self-)selection relates to the incentives leading high ability individuals to enter – or abstain from entering – into politics. In this article, we use data from Italian municipalities over the period 1985-2012 to empirically assess how changes in individuals’ expected payoffs affect political (self-)selection. Identification derives from murders of local politicians by the mafia, and indicates that such a negative shock to politicians’ expected payoffs induces a strong decrease in first-time elected politicians’ human capital. The effect is not limited to the municipality where a political murder takes place, but also extends to nearby municipalities. |
dc.format | 37 p. |
dc.format | application/pdf |
dc.language | eng |
dc.publisher | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona |
dc.relation | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions |
dc.relation | IEB Working Paper 2015/37 |
dc.rights | cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Daniele, 2015 |
dc.rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.subject | Crim organitzat |
dc.subject | Màfia |
dc.subject | Eleccions |
dc.subject | Polítics |
dc.subject | Organized crime |
dc.subject | Mafia |
dc.subject | Elections |
dc.subject | Politicians |
dc.title | Strike one to educate one hundred: organized crime, political selection and politicians’ ability |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |