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Títol:	Strike one to educate one hundred: organized crime, political selection and politicians’ ability
Autor/a:	Daniele, Gianmarco
Notes:	A central question in terms of political (self-)selection relates to the incentives leading high ability individuals to enter – or abstain from entering – into politics. In this article, we use data from Italian municipalities over the period 1985-2012 to empirically assess how changes in individuals’ expected payoffs affect political (self-)selection. Identification derives from murders of local politicians by the mafia, and indicates that such a negative shock to politicians’ expected payoffs induces a strong decrease in first-time elected politicians’ human capital. The effect is not limited to the municipality where a political murder takes place, but also extends to nearby municipalities.
Matèries:	-Crim organitzat -Màfia -Eleccions -Polítics -Organized crime -Mafia -Elections -Politicians
Drets:	cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Daniele, 2015 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
Tipus de document:	Document de treball
Publicat per:	Institut d’Economia de Barcelona
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