2017-01-24T08:11:25Z
2017-01-24T08:11:25Z
2017
2017-01-24T08:11:25Z
We consider a multi-sided assignment game with the following characteristics: (a) the agents are organized in m sectors that are connected by a graph that induces a weighted m-partite graph on the set of agents, (b) a basic coalition is formed by agents from different connected sectors, and (c) the worth of a basic coalition is the addition of the weights of all its pairs that belong to connected sectors. We provide a sufficient condition on the weights to guarantee balancedness of the related multi-sided assignment game. Moreover, when the graph on the sectors is cycle-free, we prove the game is strongly balanced and the core is described by means of the cores of the underlying two-sided assignment games associated with the edges of this graph. Moreover, once selected a spanning tree of the cycle-free graph on the sectors, the equivalence between core and competitive equilibria is established.
Document de treball
Anglès
Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica); Assignació de recursos; Equilibri (Economia); Cooperative games (Mathematics); Resource allocation; Equilibrium (Economics)
Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
UB Economics – Working Papers, 2017, E17/357
[WP E-Eco17/357]
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Ata et al., 2017
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/