Individuals Who Believe in the Paranormal Expose Themselves to Biased Information and develop More Causal Illusions than Nonbelievers in the Laboratory

Fecha de publicación

2016-12-05T17:01:53Z

2016-12-05T17:01:53Z

2015

2016-12-05T17:01:58Z

Resumen

In the reasoning literature, paranormal beliefs have been proposed to be linked to two related phenomena: a biased perception of causality and a biased information-sampling strategy (believers tend to test fewer hypotheses and prefer confirmatory information). In parallel, recent contingency learning studies showed that, when two unrelated events coincide frequently, individuals interpret this ambiguous pattern as evidence of a causal relationship. Moreover, the latter studies indicate that sampling more cause-present cases than cause-absent cases strengthens the illusion. If paranormal believers actually exhibit a biased exposure to the available information, they should also show this bias in the contin- gency learning task: they would in fact expose themselves to more cause-present cases than cause-absent trials. Thus, by combining the two traditions, we predicted that believers in the paranormal would be more vulnerable to developing causal illusions in the laboratory than nonbelievers because there is a bias in the information they experience. In this study, we found that paranormal beliefs (measured using a questionnaire) correlated with causal illusions (assessed by using contingency judgments). As expected, this correlation was mediated entirely by the believers' tendency to expose themselves to more cause-present cases. The association between paranormal beliefs, biased exposure to information, and causal illusions was only observed for ambiguous materials (i.e., the noncontingent condition). In contrast, the participants' ability to detect causal relationships which did exist (i.e., the contingent condition) was unaffected by their susceptibility to believe in paranormal phenomena

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Public Library of Science (PLoS)

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Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0131378

PLoS One, 2015, vol. 10, num. 7, p. e0131378

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0131378

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cc-by (c) Blanco, Fernando et al., 2015

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es

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