Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
2015
A group of individuals is choosing an individual (the winner) among themselves, when the identity of the deserving winner is a common knowledge among individuals. A simple mechanism of voting by veto is proposed as an alternative to the mechanism studied by Amorós (2011). Like Amorós’(2011), the suggested mechanism implements the socially desirable outcome (the deserving winner is chosen) in subgame perfect equilibria. Keywords: Implementation, mechanism design, subgame perfect equilibrium, individuals choosing among themselves, voting by veto. JEL classification: C72, D71, D78
Documento de trabajo
Inglés
10 p.
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia; 2015-20
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