A mechanism to pick the deserving winner

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RECERCAT Home > Universitat Rovira i Virgili > Departament d'Economia > Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia > View document

Use this identifier to quote or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/252215

dc.contributor	Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor	Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
dc.contributor.author	Moskalenko, Anna
dc.date.accessioned	2015-07-13T07:20:40Z
dc.date.available	2015-07-13T07:20:40Z
dc.date.created	2015-05-14
dc.date.issued	2015
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2072/252215
dc.format.extent	10 p.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-20
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights	L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.source	RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other	Jocs no-cooperatius (Matemàtica)
dc.subject.other	Elecció social
dc.title	A mechanism to pick the deserving winner
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.subject.udc	33 - Economia
dc.embargo.terms	cap
dc.description.abstract	A group of individuals is choosing an individual (the winner) among themselves, when the identity of the deserving winner is a common knowledge among individuals. A simple mechanism of voting by veto is proposed as an alternative to the mechanism studied by Amorós (2011). Like Amorós’(2011), the suggested mechanism implements the socially desirable outcome (the deserving winner is chosen) in subgame perfect equilibria. Keywords: Implementation, mechanism design, subgame perfect equilibrium, individuals choosing among themselves, voting by veto. JEL classification: C72, D71, D78

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