A mechanism to pick the deserving winner

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Use this identifier to quote or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/252215

Title:	A mechanism to pick the deserving winner
Author:	Moskalenko, Anna
Other authors:	Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia; Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
Abstract:	A group of individuals is choosing an individual (the winner) among themselves, when the identity of the deserving winner is a common knowledge among individuals. A simple mechanism of voting by veto is proposed as an alternative to the mechanism studied by Amorós (2011). Like Amorós’(2011), the suggested mechanism implements the socially desirable outcome (the deserving winner is chosen) in subgame perfect equilibria. Keywords: Implementation, mechanism design, subgame perfect equilibrium, individuals choosing among themselves, voting by veto. JEL classification: C72, D71, D78
Publication date:	2015
Subject (UDC):	33 - Economia
Subject(s):	Jocs no-cooperatius (Matemàtica) Elecció social
Rights:	L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
Pages:	10 p.
Document type:	Working Paper
Published by:	Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
Collection:	Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-20
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