Universitat de Girona
2012-01
Proving the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in auction mechanism design. In this paper we discuss the strategy proofness of a multi-attribute auction mechanism using three different approaches: the analysis of the mechanism properties, a mathematical analysis to determine if agents can take advantage of dishonest strategies and the use of simulations to study the behaviour of bidders
This research project has been partially funded through the projects labeled TIN2008- 04547 and DPI2011-24929, and BR10/18 Scholarship of the University of Girona granted to Albert Pla
Informe
Anglès
Subhastes -- Models matemàtics; Auctions -- Mathematical models
Universitat de Girona. Institut d'Informàtica i Aplicacions
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MICINN//DPI2011-24929/ES/I-WMS: METODOS DE SOPORTE A LA DECISION PARA SISTEMAS DE GESTION DE WORKFLOWS FLEXIBLES/
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MICINN//TIN2008-04547/ES/SUBASTAS ROBUSTAS MEDIANTE LA INCORPORACION DE TECNICAS DE SATISFACTIBILIDAD MODULO TEORIAS/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
