dc.contributor.author
Pla Planas, Albert
dc.contributor.author
López Ibáñez, Beatriz
dc.contributor.author
Murillo Espinar, Javier
dc.date.accessioned
2024-06-13T10:05:28Z
dc.date.available
2024-06-13T10:05:28Z
dc.identifier
http://hdl.handle.net/10256/8026
dc.identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/10256/8026
dc.description.abstract
Proving the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in auction mechanism design. In this paper we discuss the strategy proofness of a multi-attribute auction mechanism using three different approaches: the analysis of the mechanism properties, a mathematical analysis to determine if agents can take advantage of dishonest strategies and the use of simulations to study the behaviour of bidders
dc.description.abstract
This research project has been partially funded through the projects labeled TIN2008-
04547 and DPI2011-24929, and BR10/18 Scholarship of the University of Girona granted
to Albert Pla
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
Universitat de Girona. Institut d'Informàtica i Aplicacions
dc.relation
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MICINN//DPI2011-24929/ES/I-WMS: METODOS DE SOPORTE A LA DECISION PARA SISTEMAS DE GESTION DE WORKFLOWS FLEXIBLES/
dc.relation
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MICINN//TIN2008-04547/ES/SUBASTAS ROBUSTAS MEDIANTE LA INCORPORACION DE TECNICAS DE SATISFACTIBILIDAD MODULO TEORIAS/
dc.rights
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
Informes (IIIA)
dc.subject
Subhastes -- Models matemàtics
dc.subject
Auctions -- Mathematical models
dc.title
Proving Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Attribute Auctions
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/report
