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dc.contributor.author | Esteller Moré, Alejandro |
---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Galmarini, Umberto |
dc.contributor.author | Rizzo, Leonzio |
dc.date | 2017-09-14T11:58:45Z |
dc.date | 2017-09-14T11:58:45Z |
dc.date | 2015 |
dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/115376 |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/115376 |
dc.description | We examine the design of fiscal equalization transfers aimed at interregional redistribution in a setting in which special interest groups distort the fiscal policies of local governments. Equity always calls for tax-base equalization while efficiency calls for tax-base equalization of fiscal capacities backed by strong lobby groups and for taxrevenue equalization of those backed by weak lobby groups. Hence, it is optimal to rely only on tax-base equalization if the special interest groups are similar in terms of lobbying power, whereas a mixed system is optimal if they are highly heterogeneous. Tax competition reinforces the role of tax-base, while tax exporting that of tax-revenue, fiscal equalization. |
dc.format | 37 p. |
dc.format | application/pdf |
dc.language | eng |
dc.publisher | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona |
dc.relation | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions |
dc.relation | IEB Working Paper 2015/21 |
dc.relation | [WP E-IEB15/21] |
dc.rights | cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Esteller Moré et al., 2015 |
dc.rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.subject | Política fiscal |
dc.subject | Impostos |
dc.subject | Distribució (Teoria de la probabilitat) |
dc.subject | Fiscal policy |
dc.subject | Taxation |
dc.subject | Distribution (Probability theory) |
dc.title | Fiscal equalization under political pressures |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |