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Optimal second-degree price discrimination and arbitrage: On the role of asymetric information among buyers
Jeon, Doh Shin; Menicucci, Domenico
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
The traditional theory of monopolistic screening tackles individualself-selection but does not address the possibility that buyers couldform a coalition to coordinate their purchases and to reallocate thegoods. In this paper, we design the optimal sale mechanism which takesinto account both individual and coalition incentive compatibilityfocusing on the role of asymmetric information among buyers. We showthat when a coalition of buyers is formed under asymmetric information,the monopolist can do as well as when there is no coalition. Although inthe optimal sale mechanism marginal rates of substitution are notequalized across buyers (hence there exists room for arbitrage), theyfail to realize the gains from arbitrage because of the transaction costsin coalition formation generated by asymmetric information.
monopolistic screening
coalition incentive compatibility
asymetric information
transaction costs
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