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Bundling electronic journals and competition among publishers
Jeon, Doh-Shin; Menicucci, Domenico
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
Site licensing of e-journals has been revolutionizing the way academicinformation is distributed. However, many librarians are concerned aboutthe possibility that publishers might abuse site licensing by practicingbundling. In this paper, we analyze the private and social incentives forthe publishers to use bundling in the context of STM electronic journalmarket. In the short run in which the number of journals is exogenouslygiven, we find a strong conflict between the two incentives: each publisherfinds bundling optimal and bundling increases the industry profit butreduces social welfare. However, in the long run we find that publishersmight have higher incentives to introduce new journals under bundlingthan without bundling and, in this case, bundling can reduce the industryprofit while increasing social welfare. Finally, we examine publishers incentive to provide links to the websites of the rival publishers underbundling and show that even asymmetric publishers have incentive tointerconnect.
site licensing
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