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Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization
Garoupa, Nuno
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.
2005-09-15
Business Economics and Industrial Organization
organized crime
punishment
plea-bargaining
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Working Paper
         

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