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Optimal magnitude and probability of fines
Garoupa, Nuno
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
The economic literature on crime and punishment focuses on the trade-off between probability and severity of punishment, and suggests that detection probability and fines are substitutes. In this paper it is shown that, in presence of substantial underdeterrence caused by costly detection and punishment, these instruments may become complements. When offenders are poor, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is low. Thus, the government does not invest a lot in detection. If offenders are rich, however, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is high, so it is more profitable to prosecute them.
15-09-2005
Business Economics and Industrial Organization
crime
probability and severity of sanctions
law enforcement
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