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dc.contributor | Universitat de Barcelona |
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dc.contributor.author | Llerena Garrés, Francesc |
dc.contributor.author | Rafels, Carles |
dc.date | 2010-04-12T07:53:04Z |
dc.date | 2010-04-12T07:53:04Z |
dc.date | 2005 |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/12043 |
dc.description.abstract | This paper provides an axiomatic framework to compare the D-core (the set of undominated imputations) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility. Theorem 1 states that the D-core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonableness (from above), (*)-antimonotonicity, and modularity. Theorem 2 characterizes the core replacing (*)-antimonotonicity by antimonotonicity. Moreover, these axioms also characterize the core on the domain of convex games, totally balanced games, balanced games, and superadditive games |
dc.description.abstract | Aquest article proporciona un marc axiomàtic per a comparar el Cor de d (el joc d'imputacions indominades) i el cor d'un joc cooperatiu amb la utilitat trasferible. El teorema 1 estats que el Cor de d és l'única solució que satisfà la consistència de projecció, el raonable (des de dalt), (*)-*antimonotonicity, i la *modularitat. El teorema 2 caracteritza el substituir de cor (*)-*antimonotonicity per *antimonotonicity. A més, aquests axiomes també caracteritzen el cor sobre el domini de jocs convexs, jocs totalment equilibrats, jocs equilibrats, i jocs superadditius. |
dc.format | 156078 bytes |
dc.format | 15 p. |
dc.format | application/pdf |
dc.language.iso | eng |
dc.publisher | Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa |
dc.relation | Reproducció digital del document publicat a http://www.ere.ub.es/dtreball/E05144.rdf/view |
dc.relation | Documents de treball (Facultat d'Economia i Empresa. Espai de Recerca en Economia), 2005, E05/144 |
dc.relation | [WP E-Eco05/144] |
dc.rights | cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Llerena et al., 2005 |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
dc.subject | Teoria de jocs |
dc.subject | Game theory |
dc.title | The set of undominated imputations and the core: an axiomatic approach |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |