Testing for asymmetric information in private health insurance

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RECERCAT Home > Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona > Articles escrits per personal UAB o publicats per la universitat > View document

dc.contributor.author	Olivella, Pau
dc.contributor.author	Vera-Hernández, Marcos
dc.date	2013
dc.identifier	https://ddd.uab.cat/record/174274
dc.identifier	urn:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02520.x
dc.identifier	urn:oai:ddd.uab.cat:174274
dc.identifier	urn:recercauab:ARE-74745
dc.identifier	urn:articleid:00130133v123n567p96
dc.identifier	urn:scopus_id:84874377706
dc.identifier	urn:wos_id:000315487600004
dc.identifier	urn:altmetric_id:2301920
dc.identifier	urn:oai:egreta.uab.cat:publications/904495a5-f1d3-4e40-89de-46f740efb0b9
dc.format	application/pdf
dc.language	eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation	Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2009SGR-169
dc.relation	Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia ECO2009-07616
dc.relation	Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad CSD2006-16
dc.relation	The Economic journal ; Vol. 123, Num. 567 (2013), p. 96-130
dc.rights	open access
dc.rights	Tots els drets reservats.
dc.rights	https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subject	Private health insurance
dc.title	Testing for asymmetric information in private health insurance
dc.type	Article
dc.description.abstract	Vera-Hernández acknowledges support from the ESRC Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis of Public Policy (RES-544-28-0001). Olivella acknowledges the support of the Government of Catalonia, project 2009SGR-169; as well as from the Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, project ECO2009-07616 and CONSOLIDER-INGENIO CSD2006-16. Olivella is a Research Fellow of MOVE.
dc.description.abstract	Altres ajuts: RES-544-28-0001
dc.description.abstract	We test for asymmetric information in the UK private health insurance (PHI) market. In contrast to earlier research that considers either a purely private system or one where private insurance is complementary to public insurance, PHI is substitutive of the public system in the UK. Using a theoretical model of competition among insurers incorporating this characteristic, we link the type of selection (adverse or propitious) with the existence of risk-related information asymmetries. Using the British Household Panel Survey, we find evidence that adverse selection is present in the PHI market, which leads us to conclude that such information asymmetries exist.

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