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Endogenous price leadership
van Damme, Eric; Hurkens, Sjaak
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with differentiated products and determine endogenously which of the players will lead and which will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each firm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), allow the conclusion that only the highcost firm will choose to wait. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader.
15-09-2005
Microeconomics
price leadership
endogenous timing
risk dominance
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