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Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets
Hauk, Esther; Hurkens, Sjaak
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
Two-stage game models of information acquisition in stochastic oligopoliesrequire the unrealistic assumption that firms observe the precision ofinformation chosen by their competitors before determining quantities. Thispaper analyzes secret information acquisition as a one-stage game. Relativeto the two-stage game firms are shown to acquire less information. Policyimplications based on the two-stage game yield, therefore, too high taxes ortoo low subsidies for research activities. For the case of heterogeneousduopoly it is shown that comparative statics results partly depend on theobservability assumption.
15-09-2005
Microeconomics
information acquisition
oligopoly
uncertainty
bayesian equilibrium
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