Voting games with abstention: linking completeness and weightedness

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dc.contributor	Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada III
dc.contributor	Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs
dc.contributor.author	Freixas Bosch, Josep
dc.contributor.author	Tchantcho, Bertrand
dc.contributor.author	Tedjeugang, Narcisse
dc.date	2014-01-01
dc.identifier.citation	Freixas, J.; Tchantcho, B.; Tedjeugang, N. Voting games with abstention: linking completeness and weightedness. "Decision support systems", Gener 2014, vol. 57, p. 172-177.
dc.identifier.citation	0167-9236
dc.identifier.citation	10.1016/j.dss.2013.08.015
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2117/24929
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject	Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs
dc.subject	Decision making -- Mathematical models
dc.subject	Voting -- Mathematical models
dc.subject	Voting -- Abstention
dc.subject	Decision making process
dc.subject	Voting systems in democratic organizations
dc.subject	Multiple levels of approval
dc.subject	Weightedness and completeness
dc.subject	Desirability relations
dc.subject	Approval
dc.subject	Power
dc.subject	Representation
dc.subject	Systems
dc.subject	Output
dc.subject	Input
dc.subject	Decisió, Presa de -- Models matemàtics
dc.subject	Vot -- Models matemàtics
dc.subject	Abstencionisme electoral
dc.subject	Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory
dc.subject	Classificació AMS::05 Combinatorics::05C Graph theory
dc.subject	Classificació AMS::94 Information And Communication, Circuits::94C Circuits, networks
dc.subject	Classificació AMS::90 Operations research, mathematical programming::90B Operations research and management science
dc.title	Voting games with abstention: linking completeness and weightedness
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.description.abstract	Weighted games for several levels of approval in input and output were introduced in [9]. An extension of the desirability relation for simple games, called the influence relation, was introduced for games with several levels of approval in input in [24] (see also [18]). However, there are weighted games not being complete for the influence relation, something different to what occurs for simple games. In this paper we introduce several extensions of the desirability relation for simple games and from the completeness of them it follows the consistent link with weighted games, which solves the existing gap. Moreover, we prove that the influence relation is consistent with a known subclass of weighted games: strongly weighted games. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.description.abstract	Peer Reviewed

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