Use this identifier to quote or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/222197

Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes
Dahm, Matthias; Esteve, Patrícia,
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia; Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
Some affirmative action policies establish that a set of disadvantaged competitors has access to an extra prize. Examples are gender quotas or a prize for national competitors in an international competition. We analyse the effects of creating an extra prize by reducing the prize in the main competition. Contestants differ in ability and agents with relatively low ability belong to a disadvantaged minority. All contestants compete for the main prize, but only disadvantaged agents can win the extra prize. We show that an extra prize is a powerful tool to ensure participation of disadvantaged agents. Moreover, for intermediate levels of the disadvantage of the minority, introducing an extra prize increases total equilibrium effort compared to a standard contest. Thus, even a contest designer not interested in affirmative action might establish an extra prize in order to enhance competition. Keywords: Asymmetric contest, equality of opportunity, affirmative action, discrimination, prize structure, exclusion principle. JEL: C72, D72, I38, J78
2013
33 - Economia
Jocs no-cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Política pública
Política laboral
Discriminació positiva
Igualtat d'oportunitats
Preus -- Control
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
37 p.
Working Paper
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2013-34
         

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