Use this identifier to quote or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/148481

Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit
Corchón, Luis C.; Dahm, Matthias
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
We analyze how a contest organizer chooses optimally the winner when the contestants' efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. We de…ne the notion of rationalizability in mixed-strategies to capture such a situation. Our approach allows to derive different contest success functions depending on the aims and attitudes of the decider. We derive contest success functions which are closely related to commonly used functions providing new support for them. By taking into account social welfare considerations our approach bridges the contest literature and the recent literature on political economy. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function, Mixed-Strategies. JEL Classi…cation: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances)
2010
338 - Situació econòmica. Política econòmica. Gestió, control i planificació de l'economia. Producció. Serveis. Turisme. Preus
Teoria de jocs
Ciències polítiques -- Models matemàtics
Presa de decisions
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Working Paper
1988 - 0812
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2010-05
         

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