dc.contributor.author
Albalate, Daniel, 1980-
dc.contributor.author
Bel i Queralt, Germà, 1963-
dc.contributor.author
Geddes, R. Richard
dc.date.issued
2015-09-18T06:26:44Z
dc.date.issued
2015-09-18T06:26:44Z
dc.date.issued
2015-09-18T06:26:45Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/66929
dc.description.abstract
Public-Private-Partnerships are long-term, relational contracts between a public-sector sponsor and a private partner to deliver infrastructure projects across a range of economic sectors. Efficiency gains may derive from risk transfer and bundling different tasks within a single contract. We study the factors explaining the scope of bundling. We focus on the choice between weak vertical integration, which includes operational tasks alone or construction tasks alone, versus strong vertical integration, which involves the combination of operational and construction tasks. We utilize a new data set that includes 553 PPPs concluded in the U.S. between 1985 and 2013.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
Universitat de Barcelona. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública
dc.relation
Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2015/201518.pdf
dc.relation
IREA – Working Papers, 2015, IR15/18
dc.relation
[WP E-IR15/18]
dc.rights
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Albalate et al., 2015
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
Documents de treball (Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública (IREA))
dc.subject
Integració vertical
dc.subject
Empreses públiques
dc.subject
Cooperació empresarial
dc.subject
Projecte d'empresa
dc.subject
Vertical Integration
dc.subject
Government business enterprises
dc.subject
Enterprise cooperation
dc.subject
Business planning
dc.title
Strong versus Weak Vertical Integration: Contractual Choice and PPPs in the United States
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
