Consistency and the core of multi-sided assignment markets

Abstract

[cat] En aquest treball es demostra que en el domini dels jocs d’assignació equilibrats multisectorials (Quint, 1991), el core és l’única solució no buida que satisfà derived consistency i projection consistency. També es caracteritza el core en tota la classe dels jocs d’assignació multisectorials amb els axiomes de singleness best, individual antimonotonicity i derived consistency. Com a casos particulars, s’obtenen dues noves axiomàtiques del core per als jocs d’assignació bilaterals (Shapley and Shubik, 1972).

[eng] On the domain of balanced multi-sided assignment games (Quint, 1991), the core is characterized as the unique non-empty solution satisfying derived consistency and projection consistency. As a consequence, a new characterization of the core of two-sided assignment games (Shapley and Shubik, 1972) is provided by using simultaneously the aforementioned consistency axioms. We also characterize the core on the whole domain of multi-sided assignment games in terms of singleness best, individual anti-monotonicity and derived consistency. Again, as a particular case we obtain a new axiomatization for the bilateral case without making use of the non-emptiness axiom.