dc.contributor.author
Calleja, Pere
dc.contributor.author
Rafels, Carles
dc.contributor.author
Tijs, Stef
dc.date.issued
2013-02-25T16:20:37Z
dc.date.issued
2013-02-25T16:20:37Z
dc.date.issued
2013-02-25T16:20:37Z
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/33973
dc.description.abstract
[cat] En aquest treball caracteritzem les solucions puntuals de jocs cooperatius d'utilitat transferible que compleixen selecció del core i monotonia agregada. També mostrem que aquestes dues propietats són compatibles amb la individualitat racional, la propietat del jugador fals i la propietat de simetria. Finalment, caracteritzem les solucions puntuals que compleixen les cinc propietats a l'hora.
dc.description.abstract
[eng] We characterize single-valued solutions of transferable utility cooperative games satisfying core selection and aggregate monotonicity. Fur- thermore, we show that these two properties are compatible with individual rationality, the dummy player property and the symmetry property. We nish characterizing single-valued solutions satisfying these ve properties.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
dc.relation
Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ere.ub.es/dtreball/E10237.rdf/view
dc.relation
Documents de treball (Facultat d'Economia i Empresa. Espai de Recerca en Economia), 2010, E10/237
dc.relation
[WP E-Eco10/237]
dc.rights
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Calleja Cortés et al., 2010
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]
dc.subject
Economia matemàtica
dc.subject
Teoria de jocs
dc.subject
Simetria (Matemàtica)
dc.subject
Mathematical economics
dc.subject
Symmetry (Mathematics)
dc.title
Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
